Significance: This ruling established that the Supreme Court could pass judgment on the political issue of gerrymandering, or setting up the voting districts to give special advantages to one group. However, the Court ruled that it could make such judgments only in cases where either a majority of voters objected to it or a minority of voters were denied a fair chance to have their say in the political process.
Background: In 1981 new legislative districting lines were drawn in Indiana. A group of Indiana Democrats claimed that the lines were unfairly drawn by Republicans, who were the majority party. The Democrats accused the Republicans of gerrymandering to ensure a Republican advantage in future elections. Two questions were central to this case: (1) did the Supreme Court have the right to rule on cases of political gerrymandering? and if so, (2) did the districting plan in Indiana violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Decision: This case was argued on October 7, 1985, and decided on June 30, 1986, with a separate vote for each central question. The issue of whether political gerrymandering was subject to judicial review was decided by a vote of 6 to 3, with Justice Byron White speaking for the Court, and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Warren Burger, and William Rehnquist dissenting. The majority opinion indicated that redistricting is subject to judicial review, but only for cases in which a majority of voters object to such redistricting or when it denies a minority of voters a fair opportunity to have a voice in the political process.
The question of whether Indiana’s redistricting violated the equal protection clause was decided by a vote of 7 to 2, with Justice Byron White speaking for the Court, and Justices Lewis Powell and John Stevens in dissent. The Court found that Indiana’s 1981 redistricting showed no sign that it was deliberately unfair to the opposition party.
Excerpt from the Opinion of the Court: “The typical election for legislative seats in the United States is conducted in described geographical districts, with the candidate receiving the most votes in each district winning the seat allocated to that district. If all or most of the districts are competitive—defined by the District Court in this case as districts in which the anticipated split in the party vote is within the range of 45% to 55%—even a narrow statewide preference for either party would produce an overwhelming majority for the winning party in the state legislature. This consequence, however, is inherent in winner-take-all, district-based elections, and we cannot hold that such a reapportionment law would violate the Equal Protection Clause because the voters in the losing party do not have representation in the legislature in proportion to the statewide vote received by their party candidates.”
